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This paper aims to outline the benefits justifying a tailored approach to System Dynamics
(SD) modelling in the public sector, to improve performance and foster decision makers’
accountability. Theneedof combiningan ‘internal’with an ‘external’ perspective (in respect
to decisionmakers) in developing SDmodels is claimed.Different levels of intervention (i.e.
macro, micro and meso) are discussed. Two case studies are analysed. The first one
demonstrates how a dynamic resource-based view (DRBV) can support an analysis of
the impact of back and front office units on a public sector organization’s performance
drivers. The second case shows how SDmodelling based on a DRBV can also be applied to
improve performance on a political level. Copyright# 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the unresolved problems in public sector
research and practice stands into the evaluation
and improvement of results produced by
invested resources. Related to this, there is also
the issue of motivating and orientating public
sector decisionmakers towards a consistent set of
goals and objectives. This, in turn, reminds two
other significant themes, i.e.: (a) ensuring a
proper coordination of decision makers, often
operating inside different institutions; and (b)
making them accountable to their stakeholders,
citizens and the society.
While decision making, performance and
accountability provide a wide area on which
both research and practice have been working
with specific reference to the private sector since
a long time ago, it seems that many experiences
matured over the years from success and failure
on this regard cannot be easily transposed to the
public sector (Talbot, 2005). In fact, it is claimed
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(Rainey andHan Chun, 2005) that such sector has
its own peculiar complexity, which requires
proper ‘lenses’ to frame the problems and to
figure out alternative ways to manage them.
PURPOSE AND STRUCTURE OF THIS
PAPER
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the
benefits justifying a tailored approach to System
Dynamics (SD) modelling in the public sector, to
improve its performance and foster decision
makers’ accountability.
It will be remarked that:
(1) Improving performance and fostering
accountability in the public sector requires
understanding the impact of back office units
on delivered services. This is not an easy task,
since a bureaucratic perspective 1 tends to be
adopted when the contribution of such units
to public service is considered (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992, Chapter 6). Provided that back
office units take a major role in delivering
such service (Millard et al., 2004), this
perspective significantly tackles efforts in
making public sector decision makers
accountable 2. Overcoming this problem
requires the identification of ‘administrative
products’ (Knoepfel et al., 2007, p. 206 and
236), i.e. the measurable results generated by
the tasks fulfilled by both back and front-
office units. This implies the identification of
internal and external ‘clients’ 3 and corre-
sponding performance targets 4.
Such approach allows one to shift the view
of Public Administration (PA) from a bureau-
cratic to a citizen and community-oriented
perspective (Barzelay, 1992, Chapter 8). In
fact, performance targets can drive the
activity of public sector units and the
evaluation of achieved results.
A first case-study will be analysed to
demonstrate how a dynamic resource-based
view (DRBV) (Morecroft, 2007, pp. 59–85) can
support both back and front-office unit
managers in a public sector institution, to
frame administrative processes, constraints,
strategic resources, and policy levers on
which to act, in order to affect results.
(2) Modelling public sector performance should
take into account not only an industry 5 but
also the decision makers’ perspective, i.e. the
viewpoint of each player (e.g. in terms of
available resources, policy levers, constraints,
objectives) affecting the system’s behaviour.
This opens the discussion towards the need
to combine what we may call an ‘external’
with an ‘internal’ view of SDmodelling in the
public sector. Such perspective provides the
basis to apply the DRBV as an approach to
foster performance improvement and
accountability at different levels (i.e. macro,
micro and meso) of intervention.
An analysis of the potential application
areas of SD modelling according to such
levels will be done. The discussion of a
second case will finally illustrate the useful-
ness of the proposed modelling approach,
applied to a political context.
Based on the above set of purposes, this paper
is outlined along two main parts.
The first part aims to frame the theme of
assessing and improving performance in the
public sector, and fostering decision makers’
accountability. The central role that SD can play
in this process is emphasized.
To this end, the public sector’s peculiar com-
plexity is discussed, and a systemic framework is
proposed (‘On the Public Sector’s Peculiar Com-
plexity and the Crucial Role of Value Generation’
section) to demonstrate the need of adopting an
outcome-oriented view in assessing results
achieved by public sector institutions. It is
emphasized that such view has to consider the
value generated by the public sector to the benefit
1The bureaucratic perspective takes only the point of view of the
formal respect of norms and rules associated to the fulfilment of
administrative tasks.
2According to the Italian Ragioneria Generale dello Stato (State General
Accounting Department), in the year 2004, the personnel employed in
Italian Ministries in back-office positions was about 56% of the total
(Lucibello, 2006).
3‘Clients’ are here meant as the subjects in the interest of whom each
public sector unit delivers its services.
4The identification of administrative products is one of the building
blocks of the so called ‘New Steering Model’, i.e. a reform package
introduced in Germany in the 1990s (Pollit – Bouckaert, 2000, p. 239). 5For example health care, tourism, agriculture.
Copyright! 2010 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd. Syst. Res.27, 361^384 (2010)
DOI:10.1002/sres
362 Carmine Bianchi
RESEARCHPAPER Syst. Res.
of the private sector. This can enable the private
sector to increase its generated value, which
makes, in turn, tax raising sustainable.
Related to the issue of understanding the role
of a public sector organization in its relevant
system and assessing its performance, based on
the value generated by its services, the theme of
designing and implementing Planning & Control
(P&C) systems in the public sector is discussed in
‘The Use of Planning and Control Systems in the
Public Sector to Improve Performance: The Need
of a Learning-oriented Perspective Fostered by
SystemDynamics’ section: the need of a learning-
oriented approach is emphasized.
‘Implementing P&C Systems in the Public
Sector According to a Learning-orientedApproach:
A Dynamic Resource-based View’ section pro-
poses a DRBV as a framework to implement P&C
systems in the public sector to foster account-
ability and performance improvement, according
to a learning-oriented approach. Theuse of SDas a
method to operationalize such view is empha-
sized. On this regard, a case-study is analysed.
In the second part the need of a tailored
approach to SD modelling to support perform-
ance improvement and decision makers’
accountability is recommended.
In particular, ‘Applying SD to the Public
Sector: From an ‘External’ to an ‘Internal’
Perspective’ section frames the concepts of
‘external’ and ‘internal’ perspective in SD
modelling. ‘Main Application Areas of SD
Modelling in the Public Sector and Correspond-
ing ‘Levels’ of Analysis’ section provides an
analysis of different levels of application of SD to
the public sector. ‘Applying SD Modelling on a
Political and Inter-institutional Context: Indus-
trial District Policies’ section proposes a second
case to illustrate how the DRBV can provide
useful insights also when the themes of per-
formance improvement and accountability are
focussed from a political viewpoint.
ON THE PUBLIC SECTOR’S PECULIAR
COMPLEXITY AND THE CRUCIAL ROLE
OF VALUE GENERATION
The public sector is a complex and dynamic
system. It is complex since several institutions,
whose roles and competences cover different
inter-related domains, affect performance. Com-
plexity also stands into the constraints imposed
to the public sector decision makers by the
existing legal framework. Their decisions must
always comply with such framework, although
diverging from them could imply the achieve-
ment of better performance levels—e.g. in terms
of efficiency and effectiveness (Rosenbloom et al.,
2009).
The public sector is also a dynamic system,
since the effects produced on performance
by decisions made by the several (public and
private) actors having a stake on the system
itself, can be often observed after long
delays. Such delays are due to the time it
generally takes to public sector decisions to
generate their own outcomes on the com-
munity. They also depend on the huge net of
feedback relationships between different sub-
systems 6.
The public sector performance has a major
impact on the quality of life of people and
may constitute either an acceleration factor or a
constraint for the growth of the socio-economic
sectors profiling a given territory. A higher
accountability of the public sector, and capa-
bility to deliver better services and rules to
the private sector, may generate economic and
social value, in the system (Moore, 1995).
Such value corresponds to an increase in tangible
and intangible strategic resources 7 that are
available to the private sector. An improvement
in such resources may result into a multiplier of
the private sector performance, i.e. can deter-
mine suitable conditions to deliver products and
services that can generate new value. Part of this
value may, in turn, feed back to the public sector
again, not only in terms of taxes and other
financial contributions but also in terms of
consensus, image, etc.
6For instance, infrastructures may affect commerce or tourism, and—
in turn—commerce or tourism can affect banking and (through this
last subsystem) infrastructure funding, in a given Urban Metropolitan
area.
7For example infrastructures, funding, image of a territory, permits,
skilled manpower.
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Figure 1 8 shows how both the public and
private sectors are part of a same system, and
how the rules underlying the survival and
development of both sectors lie behind their
own capability to generate value, to make growth
sustainable 9.
Figure 1 also shows how public sector
performance does not only feed back under the
form of taxes and financial contributions from the
community to the benefit of which a given set of
services and rules is delivered but also in terms of
external contributions 10.
So, the private sector feeds back to the public
sector: public opinion is primarily affecting the
political level, and income primarily affects the
funds that the PA will be able to raise through
taxes and other sources to provide the admin-
istrative level with resources to afford public
expenditures.
How to design and implement policies aimed to
foster sustainable growth in such system? How to
prevent idiosyncratic behaviour by its players, leading
to a destruction of resources? How to make public
sector decision makers accountable on the system’s
key-performance variables?
To find an answer to the above questions, in the
last 20 years legislative frameworks have intro-
duced formal P&C systems in the public sector in
many countries of the world. This move can be
associated to a growing interest of the society
towards the improvement of public service
quality, effectiveness and operational efficiency.
This phenomenon is commonly referred as new
public management (NPM).
THE USE OF PLANNING AND CONTROL
SYSTEMS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR TO
IMPROVE PERFORMANCE: THE NEED OF
A LEARNING-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE
FOSTERED BY SYSTEM DYNAMICS
A mechanistic approach to P&C systems design
and implementation has often generated an
illusion of control and a risk of manipulation in
goal setting and performance evaluation (Bouck-
aert and Peters, 2002; Van de Walle and Roberts,
2008) 11.
To avoid that a misleading effort is produced
towards the use of formal P&C systems in the
public sector, decision makers should be enabled
to learn and practice an aptitude to communicate
each other and to be aware of the causes
Figure 1 A systemic framework embodying both the public
and private sector: value generation as a focus for assessing
performance and a prerequisite for sustaining growth
8Though Figure 1 may look like a causal loop diagram, i.e. a feedback
representation involving possible stock-and-flow simulation, this is
not properly the case here. In fact, Figure 1 tries to capture both the
public and private sector into a single and abstract framework. Such
framework remarks the role of the public sector into the wider system
where it operates, and therefore underlies the main conditions for
assessing its performance.
9Sustainable growth depends on the capability of public and private
sector organizations to generate results (e.g. in terms of products,
services or rules) which tend to produce an outcome whose value
corresponds to an increasing endowment of available resources.
10Such additional resources correspond to those that a single public
sector institution (or a group of them) ruling a given territory is able to
procure from third actors (e.g. the Union funding for infrastructure
building to the benefit of European Regions). It is worth remarking that
the above analysis is relevant not only for those public services
generating a financial value (e.g. in the case of infrastructures, edu-
cation, enterprise funding, territorial marketing) but also for those
generating a qualitative value (e.g. in the case of health care, police or
environmental care services, whose indirect outcomes have, however,
an economic value too).
11More specifically, a number of unintended effects generated by the
introduction of formal P&C systems have been remarked, such as (1)
an increase of bureaucratization; (2) a poor definition and alignment of
goals, activities, and performance indicators, and a low level of
coherence between them; (3) a missing connection between the
political and managerial level; (4) a lack of coordination between
policies undertaken by several institutions playing different roles in
the delivery of a given pool of services to citizens and the wider
community (Boyle, 1999; Pollit, 2003; Johnson, 2005); (5) overlapping
objectives and competences between different Ministries in a same
administration in a given territorial area; (6) a static and bounded view
of the relevant system for public policies and management decisions,
leading to schizophrenic and atomistic behaviour and (7) an unfo-
cussed communication to the community of the outcomes associated
to undertaken policies.
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underlying the phenomena on which they are
expected to intervene.
The roles of both politicians and managers are
dramatically changing. On the one hand, political
decision making cannot be focused on an
incremental view, which pursues a gradual
and tactical change. Today, political action
requires a higher aptitude than in the past to
frame the dynamic complexity characterizing the
systems where decisions will be made (Haynes,
2003; Klijn, 2008). It also requires a crucial
capability to foster synergies, communication
and synchronization of strategies between differ-
ent, public and private, actors involved in the
systems where politicians act.
On the other hand, managers are expected to
outline a set of objectives, consistent with
political goals and to better acquire and allocate
resources to pursue them. It is required to focus
the real impact of services on citizens and the
wider community, rather than considering
actions only in a traditional weberian perspect-
ive, i.e. through the lenses of the ‘bureaucrat’.
According to such lenses, managers’ perform-
ance can be positively assessed if decisions
have been made in compliance to laws, rules
and procedures. However, today, resource
scarcity and the proliferation of citizens’
expectations towards the public sector also
require a high promptness and selectiveness in
decision making, and an ability to undertake
networking and joined-up government (Chris-
tensen et al., 2008).
In such a new context, the P&C process cannot
be bounded to the consideration of ‘input’ factors
only. It should be, rather, broadened and more
focused on the search for continuous improve-
ment, leading to the measurement of outputs and
outcomes (Ammons, 2001, Chapter 1), which
could better respond to the various instances
converging towards the public sector.
This needs the adoption of new approaches
and tools that may foster a common shared view
among different involved actors about the causes
underlying experienced phenomena. It also
needs a new approach to planning: more
systemic and learning-oriented perspectives
should replace incremental, formal and struc-
tured ones.
SD has proven an effective method to make
explicit mental models as a way to identify
discrepancies and to induce a fruitful dialogue
between parties, such as the actors in the public
sector, and between them and those in the private
sphere. Such a dialogue is a prerequisite for
building mutual understanding, confidence and
trust between these parties and to establish a
foundation for organizational learning, a key
component in organizational development.
Making the public sector more transparent and
understandable is a prerequisite to enhance
decision makers’ accountability, since it allows
one to frame the impact of policies on perform-
ance.
IMPLEMENTING P&C SYSTEMS IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR ACCORDING TO A
LEARNING-ORIENTED APPROACH: A
DYNAMIC RESOURCE-BASED VIEW
If one adopts a ‘learning-oriented’ approach to
P&C, to support the contribution of each
responsibility area to performance improvement,
new profiles of PA appear particularly relevant,
i.e.: (1) an ‘objective’ view; (2) an ‘instrumental’
view and (3) a ‘subjective’ view.
The ‘objective’ view implies that ‘products’ (i.e.
public services) generated by administrative
tasks are made explicit (Figure 2a). By ‘products’
we do not mean the output of a production
function, which is transferred to external clients
as the object and goal of commercial transactions.
We, rather, refer to the output of administrative
tasks, aimed to deliver a value to either external 12
or internal ‘clients’ 13, with respect to the player
that is taken into account.For instance, in a public
utility water company, not only the water
provided but also the billing service can be
considered as a ‘product’ according to which
external clients may have a number of
expectations. They may expect that billing is
done according to proper accuracy, transpar-
ency and reliability standards. Therefore,
billing errors and irregular updates of con-
12That is private sector actors or outside public sector institutions.
13That is responsibility units operating inside the same institution.
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sumptions will result in a poor service, though
the quality, availability or cost of supplied
water is satisfactory. Likewise, the billing
‘product’ will be considered as poor, if
uncollected invoices—due to unreliable bill-
ing—will drop the public utility cash flows.
Related to billing (as a final ‘product’),
relevant ‘intermediate products’ for such
organization, could be referred to: metres
inspection, billing issuing, checking billing
errors and compulsory credit collection.
Although most of such ‘products’ are deliv-
ered by back-office units, they have a direct
impact on the delivered final product (i.e.
billing), resulting in a higher or lower
customer satisfaction and utility solvency.
Most of the above ‘intermediate products’
are delivered to ‘internal clients’. For instance,
the performance of a ‘customer complaints
office’, receiving requests from clients, due to
bad invoicing and/or metres checking, are
affected by the speediness and accuracy of
activities carried out by various back-office
units, such as those fulfilling operations
related to the inspection of the correct record-
ing and billing of consumed water.
This analysis remarks the need to track
management processes and underlying activities,
in order to explain how to improve results
associated to the ‘products’ delivered to both
internal and external ‘clients’ related to a given
public sector organization.
A management process can be defined as a
group of homogeneous and inter-related activi-
ties, generating a well-identified intermediate
result, oriented to the attainment of a final
‘product’.All activities pertaining to the period-
ical check of metres/bills issuing, aimed to assess
consumptions, can be grouped into a process,
whose result (i.e. metres inspection) affects the
accuracy and predictability of billing. In our
case-study, the water utility company’s ‘ser-
vices charter’ prescribed that the average time
between two inspections should have been 6
months. Since in this case, due to an excess of
workload on the staff in charge of checking
metres, this time was increasing, in spite of the
automatic resort to overtime, this caused a bad
service. In fact, for those customers whose
metres were not regularly checked, billing was
done based on past water consumptions.
Therefore, actual consumptions were ran-
domly updated and many clients found
significant unexpected and unpleasant extra-
charges in bills, which were instead punctu-
ally issued every 2 months. This phenomenon
Figure 2 (a) The ‘objective’ view, (b) the ‘instrumental’
view and (c) the ‘subjective’ view
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increased the percentage of uncollected bills
and their collection time.
Likewise, also those activities regarding the
assessment of billing errors influenced the bills
collection time. Such errors were increasing
because of a rising resort to overtime for
checking metres: in fact, increasing overtime
implied a higher occurrence of errors by the
company staff in checking actual consump-
tions. In order to reduce the disputed bills
collection time, a process similar to the one
previously commented about checking metres
was carried out. Precisely, a group of senior
inspectors was requested to verify possible
errors in checking metres, and—when necess-
ary—to start the procedure for re-issuing the
wrong bills.
Related to the above said ‘objective’ view, the
‘instrumental’ view implies that alternative means
to improve performance, in relation to a specific
‘product’, are made explicit. On this regard, it is
necessary to identify performance measures
related to both end-results and respective drivers
(Figure 2b).
In order to affect such drivers, each respon-
sibility area is expected to build up, preserve
and deploy a proper endowment of strategic
resources, systemically linked each other.
Managing strategic resources to affect perform-
ance drivers and end-results related to a given
responsibility area is a dynamic and complex
task. In fact, intangible resources are difficult to
identify and measure. Furthermore, accumu-
lation and draining processes affecting the
dynamics of strategic resources are inertial,
since delays underlying them are difficult to
perceive by decision makers, and effects gener-
ated by actions taken (or not taken) in a recent or
remote past are intertwined each other, and
single causes cannot be easily matched to
related effects (Warren, 2008). In order to
provide decision makers with proper lenses to
‘read’ such phenomena, to understand the
feedback loop structure underlying perform-
ance, and to identify alternative strategies to
undertake, SD modelling can play a major role.
On this regard, the ‘Dynamic Balanced Scor-
ecard’ (based on a DRBV) has been successfully
applied in different contexts—not only in the
private but also in the public sector (Linard,
1996; Ritchie-Dunham, 2002; Bianchi and Mon-
temaggiore, 2008).
Figure 2(b) also illustrates how the end-results
provide an endogenous source in an organization
to the accumulation and depletion processes
affecting strategic resources. In fact, they can be
modelled as in or out-flows, which change over a
given time span the corresponding stocks of
strategic resources, as a result of actions imple-
mented by decision makers. For instance, liquid-
ity (strategic resource) may change as an effect of
cash flows (end-result); image and credibility
of an organization towards citizens (strategic
resource) may change as an effect of their
satisfaction (end-result). There are also interde-
pendencies between different strategic resources:
image may affect the capability of an organiz-
ation to get funds from different stakeholders.
Furthermore, both image and financial resources
may affect its capability to recruit skilled human
resources and keep them.
Finally, the ‘subjective’ view provides a syn-
thesis of the previous two views, since it makes
explicit, as a function of the pursued results, the
activities to undertake, the related objectives (and
performance targets) to include in the plans and
budgets for each decision area.
This view requires that performance measures
associated to the delivery of organization ‘pro-
ducts’ are made explicit, and then linked to the
goals and objectives of decisionmakers operating
in different responsibility areas.
Performance measures can be firstly expressed
in terms of outcomes and related drivers. While
outcome performance indicators are a synthetic
measure of final results 14, performance drivers
are a measure of intermediate results which
affect the corresponding outcome indicators in a
longer time horizon (Kaplan and Norton, 1996)
(Figure 2c).
Results 15 are originated by decision makers’
activities carried out in the fulfilled processes.
Expected results provide a benchmark to which
14For example referred to people (customer or employees satisfaction)
or finance (cash flows, profits).
15That is both outcome indicators and performance drivers.
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to refer for setting goals and objectives for each
responsibility area in a P&C context.
Figure 3 sketches a synthetic picture of the
three above perspectives. It shows how, in a
planning context, once defined the ‘products’
originated by the fulfilment of administrative
tasks, it is needed to move backwards, i.e. to
outline the underlying processes and activities,
and then to define goals and objectives for each
responsibility area. Such objectives must corre-
spond to the results (and indicators) that will
be achieved through actions aimed to manage
a given strategic resource system. Both perform-
ance drivers and end-results should describe
whether an organization is able to meet the
various expectations (e.g. in terms of volumes,
defects, time, cost) coming from internal
and external ‘clients’, concerning delivered
‘products’.
If we refer to the above water supply public
utility case, customer satisfaction (outcome
measure) represents a flow increasing or
decreasing over time a corresponding stock,
named ‘Company Image’ (strategic asset).
Likewise, cash flows provide a rate changing
over time a corresponding strategic asset
named ‘Liquidity’.
It is also possible to detect horizontal relation-
ships between strategic assets.In our example,
‘Company Image’ may affect ‘Liquidity’, since
it influences the organization’s credibility
towards different funders (e.g. the Munici-
pality, banks). Such credibility is a perform-
ance driver affecting cash flows (outcomes)
and—through them—liquidity. The stock
of available liquidity may, in turn, affect
a third important strategic asset, i.e. ‘Human
Resources’. In fact, the more financial
resources are available, the higher the capa-
bility to hire people will be. If a water supply
company can rely on a larger staff of people
who can be devoted to the fulfilment of
processes impacting on critical performance
drivers, also organizational outcomes will
improve. In our case, relevant billing per-
formance drivers are: metres inspection time,
billing errors%, time to check billing errors,
billing collection time, company credibility
towards funders.
The case illustrated above proves the powerful
role that SD modelling can play to implement a
learning-oriented approach to P&C in the public
sector, according to the NPM perspective.
In the utility, different areas had a joint
responsibility for the fulfilment of the previously
described processes, i.e.: the periodical check of
metres/bills issuing, and the assessment of billing
errors. Activities underlying the above two pro-
cesses were managed by three units, i.e.: Com-
mercial, Legal and Technical. The Commercial
unit also consisted of five offices: Customer
Figure 3 A synthetic picture of the ‘objective’, ‘instrumental’ and ‘subjective’ view
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complaints, Contracting, Invoicing, Metres instal-
lation and Electronic Data Processing (EDP).
The invoicing process was started by period-
ical metres inspections by the Invoicing office.
The same office was also responsible of sending
senior inspectors to check metres in case of
customer complaints about suspected billing
errors. It was also responsible of asking the
‘Metres installation’ office to replace damaged
metres with new ones. Once water consumption
was periodically ascertained, bills were auto-
matically issued by the EDP.
For those bills which had not been collected
after 2 months from their issue, an overdue debt
was reported after 2 months in a new bill,
together with the new accumulated debt in the
last period. If, after two more months, the
accounts receivable had not been collected yet,
the ‘Invoicing office’ would have communicated
the total overdue to the ‘Credit collection office’
of the Legal unit. This last office was used to send
a letter to the client, to intimate payment of the
overdue, including accumulated interest. After
receiving such letter, most clients were used to
complain aboutwrong billing at the ‘Contracting’
and ‘Customers’ offices. Some of them were also
used to ask the company to test the correct
functioning of their metre. This implied that the
‘Invoicing office’ had to check metres again, in
order to verify possible billing errors; in some
cases the ‘Technical office’ was also asked by the
‘Metres installation’ office to replace old metres
with new ones (Figure 4).
These above messy problems led the company
to three main consequences: (1) a liquidity crisis,
due to the long delays in collecting overdue bills;
(2) strong conflicts between different units and
offices, all of which felt themselves not liable for
the recorded inconveniences; (3) a low customer
satisfaction, due to a lack of confidence towards
the utility about the precision and reliability of
recorded consumed water.
Although possible ‘solutions’ might seem
obvious, if we analyse the problem from outside
the public utility and after events have taken
place, the organization was not able to perceive
reality 16.
Figure 5 shows that the company policy was to
respond—after a delay—to a rise into bills
collection time by increasing staff overtime
devoted to both checking metres and uncollected
billing errors. In the short term, for both
processes, increasing overtime allowed the utility
to improve (i.e. to reduce) two important
performance drivers: metres inspection time
and time to check billing errors. This, in turn,
allowed the utility to increase its output (in terms
of checked metres and bills, respectively) and to
decrease the bills collection time (main perform-
ance driver). However, over a longer time span,
the ‘uncollected bills’ problem emerged again. In
fact, overtime productivity was gradually
decreasing, due to burnout. This was a major
cause of more billing errors and a lower number
of metres checked in an hour, which contributed
to rise the metres inspection time again. There-
fore, both phenomena caused a new increase in
the billing collection time. So, managers were
forced to periodically resort to overtime, but this
did not allow them to solve the problem.
Figure 6 depicts main performance drivers’
dynamics produced by the above policy, as
simulated through a SD model developed with
the collaboration of a manager of the utility,
operating in the budgeting unit 17. The periodic
oscillations portrayed by the graphs demonstrate
the structural inability of the above policy to
insure company performance stability in the long
run.
16This phenomenon is due to a lack of coordination and communi-
cation between the different (back and front-office) units, and to a poor
perception of delays. SD modelling can play an important role in
dealing with these problems, and fostering a process—rather than
function—oriented view of performance. A process-oriented view
implies that each organization unit is made accountable on a set of
indicators pertaining to the ‘products’ resulting from each process to
which it contributes. It also implies that, for each process, the impact of
other units on results, and the effects generated by material and
information delays are taken into account.
17The model was a follow-up of a previous Dynamic Balanced Scor-
ecard (DBSC) project embodying real detailed company data (Bianchi
andMontemaggiore, 2008). The aim of modelling was to analyse more
in depth a number of processes and inter-relationships that—in order
to follow a same level of analysis for the different subsystems—were
not included in the DBSC model. However, this was an insight model,
including—as company real data—the number of bills, the real
behaviour of billing collection time and the associated performance
drivers, as well as main delays characterising the investigated com-
pany processes. The model was used to stimulate a dialogue between
the involved units and a better understanding of their role in affecting
performance. Copy of model Equations is available on request from
the author.
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Simulation helped the utility managers to
detect major policy weaknesses and to envisage
possible solutions to the experienced pro-
blems18. Figure 7 shows main feedback loops
related to a sustainable policy. The balancing
loops B1 and B2 identify the number of needed
workers (strategic resource) to allocate to metres
inspection and checking billing errors, in order
to meet performance targets. Based on the
desired number ofworkers, the suggested policy
aims to fill human resource gaps (balancing
loops B3 and B4).
The feedback structure depicted in Figure 7
was embodied in a new version of the simulation
model, in place of the feedback structure
illustrated in Figure 5. Simulation results demon-
strated the sustainability of this new policy.
Figure 8 shows how performance drivers were
now showing a more stable behaviour, which
was proving the sustainability of the policy.
Decision makers in this public utility were
not able to perceive the causes of experienced
oscillations in performance targets. This was
because of the dynamic complexity of the
underlying system: more then 20 000 invoices
were issued per month and about 40 000 metres
had to be checked on average twice a year. Delays
between a step of the billing/collection process
and the next one, as well as interdependencies
between different responsibility areas, and a
Figure 4 Main processes and organization units responsible for the ‘billing’ product in a water public utility
18For instance, it was remarked that a possible fundamental solution
could have been to increase the number of inspectors devoted to check
metres. If necessary, also senior inspectors could have been devoted to
periodical checking, in order to reduce the backlog of metres to check,
so to keep the company on track with the ‘6 months’ average inspec-
tion time target. This would have allowed the utility to reach a more
reliable level of billing accuracy.
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missing process-oriented vision, were also sig-
nificant factors inhibiting decision makers to
properly frame such an apparently simple and
predictable system. The above problems were
also increased by the difficulty of the company
management/strategic control to perceive small
performance changes.
Figure 9 provides a synopsis of how the main
SD model’s stock-and-flow structure supported
the utility in detecting the causal relationships
between ‘products’, processes, and strategic
resources on which to act in order to affect
performance drivers and end-results, to foster
accountability. Strategic assets are depicted as
stocks primarily affecting the system’s perform-
ance. End-results are modelled as flows changing
strategic resource endowments. Performance
drivers are auxiliary variables. Processes come
from the analysis of factors impacting on the
flows affecting stocks to which performance
drivers are related (i.e. those concerning Metres
and Bills). Products are an outcome of the
carried-out processes 19.
Figure 5 Unintended effects of overtime policies in a public water utility. Key:Figure - Loop B1 and B2: symptomatic
solutions to service problems (‘metres inspection time’ and ‘time to check billing errors’, respectively);Figure - Loop R1
and R2: unintended effects amplifying service problems over a longer time span (billing errors and metres inspection
time, respectively)
19Figure 9 is a synthetic picture of the SD model that was developed
with the utility manager’s support. The dotted links it embodies
represent logical relationships between variables; therefore, some of
them are not included in themodel in the sameway they are presented
here. For instance, concerning the ‘metres inspection process’, in the
simulation model the variable ‘Productivity’ has been represented
through an auxiliary variable named ‘Number of metres checked in an
hour’. This variable (multiplied by the number of worked hours)
determines the ‘Checked metres’ flow. From the ratio between the
‘Metres to check’ stock and the above said flow, the model calculates
the auxiliary variable named ‘Metres inspection time’. In the simu-
lation model, this variable, in turn, affects the bills collection time
through the stock-and-flow chain regarding uncollected bills (which is
longer than the one depicted in Figure 9). In fact, it determines the
‘Collected issued bills’ flow, which affects the ‘New uncollected bills’
flow, which accumulates into the ‘Total uncollected bills’ stock. The
model calculates the bills collection time as a weighted average
between four major delays affecting bills collection, i.e.: (1) issued
bills collection time (ratio between Issued bills and collected issued
bills); (2) average time to check uncollected bills; (3) overdue bills
collection time and (4) overdue bills forwarded to the legal department
collection time. The stocks of bills at each stage of the described
processes have been used as weighting factors.
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The problem context described here demon-
strates the usefulness of SD as amappingmethod
to frame how decision makers can affect out-
comes in a public sector organization through
synergic policies aimed to manage strategic
resources, with a view to influencing correspond-
ing performance drivers.
The relevance of a DRBV can now open awider
discussion on the perspectives that can be used in
SDmodelling to improve performance and foster
accountability in the public sector. To what extent
the currently adopted perspective in SD research and
practice can substantially support the public sector to
this end?
APPLYING SD TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR:
FROM AN ‘EXTERNAL’ TO AN
‘INTERNAL’ PERSPECTIVE
The public sector is not new at all as an area for
SDmodelling. Though it is not the purpose of this
paper to make an exhaustive analysis of different
research streams on this wide topic, it is possible
here to outline some significant characteristics of
main research streams, approaches and appli-
cations in the field.
Traditional applications of SD in this area have
been oriented to the study of industries, like
energy (Sterman and Richardson, 1985; Davidsen
et al., 1990; Ford, 1999; Dyner and Larsen, 2001),
health care (Vennix and Gubbels, 1994; Wol-
stenholme, 1999; Lane and Huseman, 2008),
housing (Goodman, 1989, pp. 309–347), tourism
(Honggang, 2003), agriculture (Thompson et al.,
2007), fishing (Moxnes, 2000, 2005), water supply
(Martinez Fernandez and Esteve Selma, 2004),
education (Andersen, 1990; Richardson and
Lamitie, 1989).
Many of these studies have been focused on
sustainability issues (e.g. urban dynamics, tour-
ism, ecology, energy) (Forrester, 1969, 1970;
Meadows et al., 1974, 1992, 2001; Saeed, 1996;
Sterman, 2002; Fiddaman, 2007; Moxnes and
Saysel, 2009); others have been framing the
problems associated to the lack of capacity
affecting systems performance (e.g. health care).
Other applications have been oriented to depict
the structure and behaviour of multi-sectoral
economic systems, in order to support public
policy makers in understanding how wealth is
Figure 6 Main performance drivers’ dynamics from overtime policies in a public water utility.
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generated in a State or a Region, and what
interdependences exist between different sectors
of the economy (Kopainsky et al., 2009). Among
such studies, there are those focusing the topic of
poverty and wealth creation in developing and
underdeveloped countries.
In addition, topics that are longitudinal to
different sectors, and significant on a public
policy/management point of view, e.g. crime
(Homer, 1993; Coyle and Alexander, 1997;
Stephens et al., 2005; Jaen and Dyner, 2008) or
terrorism modelling (Grynkewich and Reifel,
2006), have been developed.
Also SD applications to individual public
institutions (or parts of them) have been done,
such as, for instance, in the cases of hospitals,
Universities (Barlas and Diker, 2000) and even
Courts (Bernstein, 1994).
More generally, most SD applications into the
public sector tend to be focused on under-
standing the structure and behaviour of systems
that usually embody different players, ranging
from public to private ones, from organizations
to individuals. The main focus is on the wider
system, and policy implications for each player
can be taken by the light of the responses that the
observed system’s behaviour is likely to give, as a
consequence of changes in its structure.
If one takes the point of view of each decision
maker on behalf of whom a SD model is
developed, such a perspective could be defined
as ‘external’, since it does not primarily reflect the
observation point fromwhich each involved player
perceives the system. In other words, an ‘external’
perspective primarily implies an analysis of the
relevant system per se, rather than that of a
specific decision maker. Though such analysis
does not disregard the elicitation of the decision
areas that each player is in charge of, it does not
primarily focus possible responsibility overlaps,
Figure 7 An alternative sustainable policy to fix the billing errors and collection time delays in a public water utility.
Key:Figure - Loop B1 and B2: fundamental solutions to service problems (‘metres inspection time’ and ‘time to check billing
errors’, respectively);Figure - Loop B3 and B4: strategic resource adjustments sustaining fundamental solution to service
problems (hiring needed workers gap in checking metres and checking billing errors, respectively)
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unattributed roles, inconsistencies, conflicts and
ambiguities in PA decision-making processes,
and their consequences on the governance,
management and performance of the observed
system. On the other hand, an ‘external’ perspect-
ive analysis has the merit to provide a neutral
basis to frame cause-and-effect relationships
underlying the relevant system’s behaviour,
from a point of view that may go by far
beyond—both in time and space—that each of
the involved players may take 20.
A complementary perspective may be defined
as ‘internal’, since it focuses the wide relevant
system by primarily taking the observation point of
one of the players who takes a role in affecting the
system’s behaviour (Zagonel, 2002; Richardson
et al., 2004). If such view is adopted, modelling
tends to devote a higher level of detail and scope
in the analysis of factors which specifically
impact on decisions made by the player in the
perspective of whom the model is developed. If
compared to the ‘external’ perspective, the
‘internal’ one does not necessarily imply the
adoption of narrower boundaries for the relevant
system in relation to a given problem context. It,
rather, implies a more unbalanced or asymmetric
analysis, since it tends to focus attention on the
way the observed player operates and interacts
with the other players within the relevant system.
Both the ‘external’ and ‘internal’ perspectives
are necessary in SD modelling for the public
sector. In fact, they complement each other.
Although they both support analysis, diagnosis
and decision-making processes, the first one
seems to be more suitable for analysis, while the
second is likely to better foster diagnosis and
decision making in specific areas or domains.
Therefore, the two perspectives could be seen as
Figure 8 Main performance drivers’ dynamics from the adoption of a sustainable policy to fix the billing errors and collection
time delays in a public water utility
20For instance, if the modelling goal would be understanding the
impact on urban life generated by European Union funded works
(e.g. on transportation, education, housing, water procurement and
distribution infrastructures), and related accomplishment time delays,
then an ‘external’ perspective would primarily focus the aggregate
physical, financial and information stocks and flows associated to
projects execution. Such perspective would be likely to adopt a same
level of detail and scope in the analysis of factors (e.g. roles, con-
straints, structure of management processes) impacting on each
involved player (e.g. State, RegionalMunicipal administration or other
private sector institutions such as enterprises fulfilling the public
works).
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sequential steps in SD modelling to support
public sector decision making and performance
improvement (Figure 10) 21.
Today, a wide range of SD applications to the
public sector seems to be fostered by the NPM
trend, particularly concerning the issues of value
generation, citizens’ satisfaction, performance
improvement and accountability. This shifts
the primary focus of modelling to the goals,
objectives and decisions that a politician or
manager should set in order to affect the
observed system. As said, quite seldom the area
of influence and authority of a given ‘actor’
operating in a public institution is likely to cover
the domain of the overall relevant system. The
outline of policies and undertaking of manage-
ment decisions in the public sector is often
fragmented through different institutions. There-
Figure 9 A synthetic picture of the main feedback stock-and-flow structure of a SD model supporting a dynamic resource-
based view in a public water utility
Figure 10 The ‘external’ and ‘internal’ perspective as two
sequentially-related steps to support public sector decision
making and performance improvement throughSDmodelling
21It is worth remarking that the distinction between the above two
perspectives relates to the wider methodological discussion in the SD
field about the inductive vs. deductive nature of modelling. On this
regard, it is possible to observe that—though both the external and
internal perspective underlie a mix of inductive and deductive
approach—the second approach is more ingrained into the external
perspective, while the first approach tends to prevail if one moves
towards the internal perspective. So, the two perspectives can be seen
over a continuum where each of them contributes under a different
viewpoint, towards the pursuit of a deeper learning process and better
support of decision making of the actors involved with different roles
in public sector dynamic complex systems. A similar kind of reasoning
also applies if one considers the other important debate in he SD and
sociological literature regarding the ‘structure vs. agency’ relationship.
On this regard, the ‘social structure’ view appears more ingrained into
the external perspective, while the ‘human agency’ view better reflects
the internal perspective viewpoint. (Lane, 2001; Gro¨ßler, 2004, 2008;
Schwaninger and Groesser, 2008).I am indebted to Andreas Gro¨ßler
for suggesting me possible patterns for relating the above external and
internal perspectives to the wider methodological/philosophical dis-
cussion in SD modelling.
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fore, to affect the behaviour of specific decision
makers, it is necessary to find a proper balance
between the need to model the relevant system in
relation to the main problem(s) in the observed
sector, and the need to calibrate the analysis on
what decisionmakers are enabled to affect, i.e. by
focusing the impact that the specific player could
make on the system, in his or her own perspect-
ive.
Such a different modelling perspective implies
that—for each organization unit—SD models
foster a better understanding of the relationships
between performance and responsibility. This
implies the identification of a self-consistent
system of goals and objectives for each unit.
Such goals should be embodied in a proper
budget, together with the identification of the
activities that each unit will undertake, in order
to build a strategic resource system providing a
suitable basis to affect performance drivers and
outcomes in the time horizon taken into con-
sideration. Focusing SD models on the above
perspective fosters a clearer statement and a
better understanding of goals and objectives
embodied in the planning documents, and
supports managers to frame processes, as
demonstrated in the previous section of this
paper.
Such a deeper level of knowledge and aware-
ness that this modelling perspective fosters also
prevents a number of dysfunctional behaviour
consequences that may happen when formal
P&C and performance evaluation systems are
adopted. Among them: setting easy-to-reach
objectives 22, focusing attention on only a
restricted number of objectives to the detriment
of others (related to the same goal) and confusing
means with ends 23. Such behaviour is more
evident in many public sector contexts, due to
both cultural reasons and lack of proper methods
and tools to foster learning and a proper framing
of the specific complexity characterizing such
environments 24.
MAIN APPLICATION AREAS OF SD
MODELLING IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
AND CORRESPONDING ‘LEVELS’ OF
ANALYSIS
The previous discussion remarks how using the
‘internal’ perspective as a complement to the
‘external’ one can provide a suitable basis to
apply a DRBV as an approach to foster perform-
ance improvement and accountability in the
public sector.
With the aim to move towards a tentative
framework of possible application areas for SD
modelling in this domain, we may distinguish
three main ‘levels’ of analysis, i.e. (1) a political
(or macro level); (2) a managerial (or micro level)
and (3) a political vs. managerial conversation (or
meso level).
Macro ‘level’ applications of SD focus the
perspective of political actors. They could be
referred to: (a) an ‘inter-institutional’ or (b) an
‘institutional’ context.
The inter-institutional context implies that the
political decisionmaker takes an active role in the
wider system where his institution (e.g. a State or
a Region) operates, in order to undertake a
strategic conversation with other players operat-
ing in other institutions (e.g. a Municipality) in
the system, to establish joined-up government
22This often implies the constitution of slack resources.
23On this regard, Flamholtz (1996) remarks the following: ‘Blau and
Scott (1962) reported a study of a public agency whose major goal was
to serve workers seeking employment and employers seeking
workers. The tasks to be performed included interviewing applicants,
helping them to complete application forms, counseling them, and
referring them to jobs. To control the interviewers, the agency mon-
itored the number of interviews conducted. The effect of this control
system was to motivate the interviewers. They paid attention to the
instrumental goals (numbers of interviews), while neglecting the
overall (but unmeasured) goal of placing people in jobs’.
24Improper objectives do not underlie any expected result. For
instance, stating as a plan objective ‘building a web page’, or ‘writing
and approving of a law’, or ‘re-designing organization’s procedures’ is
a wrong practice, since such statements are just descriptions of activi-
ties aimed to build strategic resources (i.e. web pages, laws, pro-
cedures). Such resources—if properly used and coordinated in a
coherent system—may allow the organization to have an impact on
its performance drivers, e.g. the waiting time of visitors to get infor-
mation from a ‘customer relationships desk. A proper goal, in this
example, could be identified the waiting time, rather than the web
page. This—and many other similar—frequent errors are often
caused by defensive routines affecting decision makers’ behaviour.
In fact, often public managers are not prone to accept the risk of
underperforming, if their perceived degree of influence on the desired
outcomes is not remarkable, or full. Unfortunately, very seldom a full
degree of influence over outcomes is possible. This is due, at least, to
two main reasons: (1) uncertainty and risk are significant factors not
only for an enterprise but also in the public sector; (2) the high
fragmentation of competencies— and, hence, the significant interde-
pendencies between different units in the public sector.
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initiatives. SD models supporting such appli-
cation areas can be developed by (or on behalf of)
a Governor’s or Mayor’s Cabinet—respectively
in a State, Region or Municipality.
This is the case—in Italy—of territorial
government, i.e. the formulation and imple-
mentation of policies affecting a geographic area,
where the political player (e.g. the regional
government) runs the role of ruler and coordi-
nator in a system affected by the behaviour of
many other actors, both public (e.g. Municipa-
lities) and private ones (e.g. enterprises). ‘Indus-
trial district’ policies provide a good example on
this regard 25.
Other examples can be referred to the govern-
ment of cities and metropolitan areas in a
perspective of sustainability, to environmental
policies aiming to face pollution, and to regional
health care systems.
Also the start of a Unified Desk for building
permits by a Municipal administration could
provide a suitable basis for the development
of SD models through an inter-institutional
perspective. Modelling how a unified desk
could simplify processes and foster synergies
between different administrations (e.g. health
care, fire department, environmental agency
and municipality) can allow decision makers to
better assess benefits on delivered services.
Labour and employment policies can also
require the development of SD models invol-
ving an inter-institutional context, e.g. to
support the design of strategies aiming to
reduce the waiting time for University gradu-
ates to find a job. More particularly, concerning
education strategies that could be outlined to
reduce the unemployment time, a SD model is
likely to support a coordination of strategies
between the Regional administration and var-
ious private institutions, such as enterprises
and education centres. It would have also an
impact—in terms of communication—with
young unemployed people and their own
families. Such policies could be outlined into
four main areas on intervention, i.e.: (1) analysis
of training needs; (2) selection and certification
of education centres, delivering Regional sub-
sidized courses; (3) communication to unem-
ployed people, about the offered courses and (4)
placement of trained people. Each of the above
areas is important to reduce the entry time in
the labour market for young people getting a
University degree.
While the inter-institutional context implies
that a player in a given institution undertakes a
strategic dialogue with other players in other
institutions, the institutional context implies that
a player undertakes a strategic dialogue with
other players operating in the same institution
where he (or she) operates. For instance, in
Italy, this happens in a regional strategic
planning context, when the governor sets a
number of goals that will provide the issues for
strategic planning inside each councillorship of
the same institution. These last goals will
represent the field for a sectoral analysis 26.
Typical sectoral views are related to: tourism,
agriculture, health care, industry and edu-
cation. Framing the relationships between such
sectors in a given geographic area provides the
field for SD models covering a multi-sectoral
domain, where policies undertaken by different
units operating in a same institution should be
coordinated 27.
This is the case of SD models covering Public
Works. For instance, in the Region of Sicily, the
political authority for Public Works is not only
attributed to the Councillorship for Infrastruc-
tures; it is instead fragmented among several
Councillorships according to the respective
spheres of competence 28. Such fragmentation
may require a coordination that SD modelling
can support.
Another example of amulti-sectoral domain for
SD modelling in the public sector at institutional
level can be referred to immigration policies.
Although in a Region a Councillorship for
Welfare may have the primary authority to deal
25A case-study on this regard will be discussed in the next section of
this paper.
26The term ‘sectoral’ is used to mean a problem context involving a
specific responsibility that is attributed to a unit (e.g. Ministry or
Councillorship) inside an institution.
27The term ‘multi-sectoral’ is used to mean a problem context invol-
ving different related responsibility areas, which imply that multiple
units (e.g. Ministries or Councillorships) inside a given institution are
required to cooperate.
28That is Agriculture, Tourism, Industry, etc.
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with issues associated to immigration and
employment, a proper coordination of such
policies with those undertaken by the Councillor-
ships of Health and Education in the same
Region is needed. This also requires consistency
with the National policies, e.g. covering illegal
immigration and internal security. Therefore,
such example provides a dimension of analysis
involving both an institutional and an inter-
institutional context.
Micro ‘level’ applications of SD focus the
perspective of management. Relevant fields for
SD modelling in this area are related to mapping
‘products’ and processes, strategic resources and
results, with the aim to foster performance
improvement at departmental or inter-depart-
mental level. On this regard, mapping the value-
chain leading to the internal and external
‘customers’ is a vital area for improving the
coordination between different sectors of the PA,
and fostering a proper communication not only
among managers but also between them and
their political counterparts.
This last issue provides the field for the third
application area, i.e. the meso level—related to
the strategic conversation between politicians
and managers. Such strategic conversation is a
crucial aspect in the public sector, for both the
implementation and the design of policies. Lack
of strategic conversation between the political
and managerial role is likely to generate a kind of
‘administrative schizophrenia’. In fact, the set-
ting of managerial objectives, actions and targets
should imply a deep understanding and com-
munication of the strategies outlined by the
political level. On the other hand, the design and
assessment of policies cannot ignore the emer-
ging problems and opportunities that can be
better perceived on a managerial level (Boyle,
1999).
APPLYING SD MODELLING ON A
POLITICAL AND INTER-INSTITUTIONAL
CONTEXT: INDUSTRIAL DISTRICT
POLICIES
The final section of this paper proposes a second
case (on industrial district policies), which aims
to illustrate how using an internal perspective in
public sector modelling can foster the imple-
mentation of a DRBV, also when one refers to
political, i.e. macro-level problems.
Industrial districts are networks of firms that
are located in a bounded territory (Alberti,
2002). Such a space is characterized by a mix
between competition and co-operation between
firms and by a wider community of institu-
tional actors 29. A horizontal division of labour,
i.e. a focus on a phase of a given production
process by small-medium enterprises (SMEs)
located in such areas is another characteristic of
industrial districts. Also the presence in the
district of strategic resources 30 that can be
easily accessed by several firms is a distinctive
feature of such areas. This allows industrial
district SMEs to benefit by important competi-
tive advantages and strong entry barriers into
the district 31.
Promoting the constitution of industrial dis-
tricts or enhancing those already existing ones
is an important role for public rulers and
administrators to generate wealth. In Italy,
since the beginning of the ‘1990s’, the
national law has focused the domain of
industrial districts. In order to define the
context for industrial policies 32, the Italian
law outlined the prerequisites for the recog-
nition of industrial districts. It also delegated
Regions to sketch specific policies aiming at
promoting the constitution and growth of local
business networks.
The district of Pesaro is characterized by a
flourishing furniture industry, where a small
number of large firms outsource a huge
percentage of their production to a myriad of
small firms. In this area about 500 manu-
facturing firms are networked with more
than 700 artisans. The role of artisans is very
29For example agencies/committees, schools, funders.
30For example skilled labour force, raw materials.
31Being local communities of people, industrial districts are also
characterized by a strong culture and high similarity of values. In
such areas, a district entrepreneurship emerges. Not only the values of
hard working and sacrifice are practiced but also those of solidarity,
confidence and trust.
32For example in terms of financial or logistical support to networked
firms or even infrastructure investments.
Copyright! 2010 JohnWiley & Sons,Ltd. Syst. Res.27, 361^384 (2010)
DOI:10.1002/sres
378 Carmine Bianchi
RESEARCHPAPER Syst. Res.
important for the district. In fact, since
they both make end products (furniture)
and produce accessories and component
parts, the full production process is frag-
mented along different specialized busin-
esses in the area. The district firms export
about 30% of their production, and their
total sales revenues are about 1.3 millions
Euros.
In such context, the Pesaro Municipality
has started a reorganization project implying
the launch of a Territorial Marketing division,
with the following objectives: (a) defining
actions for promoting the area and exploiting
its tangible and intangible assets (e.g. know-
how, culture); (b) creating favourable con-
ditions for the development of existing
resources, with the aim to improve territorial
strategic assets; (c) improving the territory
attractiveness through an inter-institutional
cooperation strategy aimed to increase the
quality of local PA services. To pursue such
objectives, a number of projects have been
started. A unified desk for production activities
has been started together with seven other
small Municipalities of the district, with the
goal to simplify bureaucratic processes and
rationalize resources through IT services.
The outcome of this reorganization is not
only limited to a more predictable and
shorter time for entrepreneurs to receive
various permissions from Municipalities but
also supports territorial marketing. In fact,
the network provided by the territorial
information system—through which the
unified desk operates—allows entrepre-
neurs, potential investors and other possible
district stakeholders to get online a compre-
hensive view of the potential of the district.
The second stream of activities started by the
Municipality of Pesaro has been focussed on
the opening of a Europe Desk. Such desk
fosters the submission of new European (EU)
projects by local district actors. It also
supports district actors in evaluating their
projects and finding partners from other
European countries. A third stream of
actions refers to the improvement of collab-
oration projects with the Pesaro Studi (Pesaro
Studies) Association, related to the Univer-
sity of Urbino. This is pursued through the
promotion and funding of new higher
education programs aimed to increase the
quality of the district human capital. A
fourth area of intervention is related to the
support of new business start-ups. This
activity is specifically oriented to the new
generations, and is focussed on the pro-
motion of new entrepreneurship, both from
inside and outside the district.
These streams of action have been embo-
died later in the city strategic plan for the
years 2003–2015. This document is con-
sidered as an example of excellence, especi-
ally concerning the level of involvement of
different public and private actors and the
quality of the process aimed to achieve a
common shared view on the policies to
adopt, according to a negotiated planning
approach. In particular, among the policy
areas included in the strategic plan, the one
focused on business attraction includes and
frames in higher detail most of the issues
discussed above.
If we try to model according to a DRBV
through the ‘lenses’ of the Municipal adminis-
tration (internal perspective) the district policies
undertaken in the area of Pesaro, we may first
identify expected end-results according to the
following set of indicators:
- district firms’ sales revenues and income rates;
- employment rates in the district;
- business net birth rate;
- the quality and scope of learning processes in
the district;
- the image of the district.
In a second step, in order to realistically
pursue the above end-results, public policy
makers should figure out those performance
drivers, according to which the impact of
undertaken policies can be assessed. In this
case, possible interrelated performance drivers
are:
- quality and scope of education, that will affect
learning;
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- quality and scope of initiatives undertaken by
governance bodies to promote new business
start-ups in the district;
- the share of projects submitted by district
actors and financed by the European Commis-
sion, as a consequence of the promotion and
consulting activities undertaken by governance
bodies 33;
- the degree of reliability and promptness of
various permits issued by Municipalities on
request of district firms 34;
- the quality and scope of information provided
on the Internet to potential investors and other
‘actors’ in the district 35.
In order to affect the above performance
drivers, another layer of analysis must be added
in the policy framing process. In fact, though
performance drivers can be affected in a shorter
time than the end-results, in order to improve
them it is necessary to detect those district
strategic resources to build up and coordinate
through district policies. Such resources could be
referred to:
- number of higher education projects. This asset
will affect quality and scope of education,
and—though it—the learning rate, which will
in turn impact on district knowledge;
- number of EU submitted and financed projects.
Such resource will affect the financed pro-
jects%;
- number of business start-up promotion initiat-
ives 36;
- level of municipal administrative processes
simplification and standardization;
- district attractiveness and image;
- level of district knowledge;
- information accessible online by various dis-
trict actors.
An overview of this three-layers district policy
model is depicted in Figure 11.
Figure 12 shows possible engines of growth for
the district. The unified desk policy may allow
district actors to improve the level of standard-
ization/reliability of Municipality processes and
the number of available information on the
Internet. Policy makers should figure out the
time delay needed to increase the above strategic
assets, and the size of such increase. Both
strategic assets will affect respective performance
Figure 11 A three-layers approach in framing industrial district policies based on a dynamic resource-based view: an
application to the case of Pesaro district
33This indicator is a measure of the ability of the system to pursue a
given learning rate, to foster an improvement in the district image, to
affect district firms sales revenues and income, as well as an increase in
employment rate.
34This indicator helps policy makers to estimate a possible impact over
time on the district image and attractiveness, and on district firms’ net
birth rate as well.
35This is another indicator impacting on the business net birth rate.
36This resource will determine a given quality and scope of business
start-up initiatives, that will in turn affect the business net birth rate.
This outcome variable will affect the number of district firms, i.e.
another important strategic resource of the district.
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drivers, which will influence the district image
and attractiveness. A higher district image will,
in turn, increase the productivity of start-up
initiative policies undertaken by governance
bodies. This will increase business net birth-rate,
which will determine a higher stock of district
firms. Such a higher strategic asset will be
likely—other conditions being equal—to
increase activity volumes, sales revenues and
income rates in the district. This improvement in
the end-results will determine a further increase
in district attractiveness and image (reinforcing
loop). Such loop will be likely to be strengthened
by a higher employment rate, which—other
conditions being equal—will make higher edu-
cation (Pesaro Studi) and Europe Desk policies
more productive. This will also result in a higher
learning rate, which will determine an increase in
another important strategic asset in the district:
knowledge. On its turn, higher district knowl-
edge will further strengthen the above reinfor-
cing growth-oriented loop, based on a district
image.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has outlined the benefits justifying a
tailored approach to SD modelling in the public
sector, in order to improve performance and
foster decision makers’ accountability.
The need of combining an ‘internal’ with an
‘external’ perspective in developing SD models
to foster performance improvement and decision
makers’ accountability has been emphasized.
Figure 12 A stock-and-flow dynamic resource-based view of district policies: an application to the case of Pesaro district
(reinforcing loop dominance). Key: Italic Bold Variables¼District Policies; Bold Variables¼Performance Drivers and
Capital Variables¼End-results
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Different levels of intervention (i.e. macro, micro
and meso) have been distinguished.
The discussion of a first case has proved the
role of the ‘internal’ perspective in supporting an
analysis of the impact of both back and front
office units on performance drivers and out-
comes, in respect to a given set of ‘administrative
products’. The usefulness of a DRBV has been
remarked.
A second case has shown how SD modelling
based on a DRBV can also be applied to improve
performance on a political level.
Further research will be necessary to develop
more applied knowledge in adopting the
‘internal’ perspective and combining it with
the ‘external’ one, to better support the multi-
faceted decision needs of different involved
actors, operating in such a peculiar dynamic
complex system, like the public sector.
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